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Abstract
This article tries to explain how misperception can trigger conflict between countries. The article
would employ spiral model of conflict proposed by Robert Jervis as a theoretical framework to
scrutinize contemporary US and Chinese contemporary competition. As a result, this paper shows
how threat assessment could trigger a spiral of conflict through state’s tendency to overestimate
threat level and its failure to perceive that defensive behavior can be interpreted as offensive by
the belligerent. Based on this analysis, the probability of conflicts can be reduced as each country
tries to comprehend motivations that drive other behavior, perceptions and reactions that might
arise as a result of the strategic empathy.
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Abstrak
Tulisan ini berusaha menjelaskan bagaimana mispersepsi dapat memicu konflik antar negara.
Dengan menggunakan kerangka teoritik model spiral konflik (spiral model) yang diajukan oleh
Robert Jervis terhadap kasus persaingan kontemporer Amerika Serikat dan Tiongkok, tulisan ini
menunjukkan bagaimana penilaian ancaman (threat assesment) dapat memicu terjadinya spiral
konflik melalui kecenderungan negara untuk menaksir terlalu tinggi tingkat ancaman yang
dihadapinya serta kegagalannya untuk memahami bahwa perilaku defensifnya dapat
diinterpretasikan sebagai ofensif oleh musuh. Berdasarkan analisa ini, secara teroritik peluang
terjadinya konflik dapat dikurangi ketika setiap negara mencoba memahami motivasi yang
mendorong perilaku aktor lain serta persepsi dan reaksi yang mungkin muncul akibat kebijakan
negara bersangkutan (strategic empathy).

Kata Kunci
Spiral Model, Mispersepsi, Hubungan AS-RRT, Penilaian Ancaman, Empati Stratejik.

INTRODUCTION
Is war between the United States and China inevitable? Will “China threat” theory
be a self-fulfilling prophecy? What is the nature of the U.S.-China relations? What are
the options available, if there is any, for policy-makers in Washington and Beijing to
avoid the collision between the great powers? These are arguably the most pertinent
questions facing the International Relations scholars today. For “the most significant
bilateral international relationship over the course of the next several decades is likely to
be between the United States and the PRC” (Friedberg, 2005, p. 8). The current
development suggesting the worsening relations between U.S. and China, from the
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prospect of trade war to the military confrontation in the disputed waters in the South
China Sea, further increase the need to explore the nature of the relationship between the
two great powers.
The structural realists’ postulation maintains that the anarchic, self-help
international system, great powers are bound to conflict. 1 For at the top of the
international power structure there is supposedly one place for the hegemon. As
convincing and parsimonious as it is, the structural explanations of the U.S.-China
conflictual relations and the prospect of war between them discount domestic-level
variables in both countries that could potentially increase, or in that matter decrease, the
prospect of conflict between the two great powers. In this respect, a closer look at the
psychological dynamic between the leaders of both U.S. and China and how they
(mis)perceive each other as threats, could enhance our understanding on what is really at
work with regard to the great powers relations. Moreover, for policy-makers, this
understanding could answer the pertinent question of whether the hegemonic clash
between the U.S. and China is really inevitable.
In this paper, I try to answer the question on how state’s threat assessment could
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Built upon Robert Jervis’s (1976) “spiral model”, my
answer to that question is that state’s threat assessment could become a self-fulfilling
prophecy through the initiation of conflict spiral. In so doing, I try to explain recent
development of U.S.-China relations in terms of how both sides apply two different logics
–perceiving other as hostile while believing that the other is aware of its benign intentionand how this has been leading the two states towards a conflict spiral recently.
This paper is structured as follows. In the first section I provide a brief synopsis
of the “spiral model” by consulting existing literatures on the topic. I then move directly
towards the application of this theoretical framework on the case of U.S.-China relations.
This paper will be concluded with some short prescriptions on how U.S. and China could
avoid the hegemonic clash by escaping the conflict spiral through clearer communication.
METHODOLOGY
Spiral Model
In the anarchic international system where there is no higher authority above states
to govern the relations between them, states basically pose potential threat to each other.
Almost all of the states possess military capabilities, although the strength is varied. In
other words, states possess the means to physically harm and possibly destroy each other. 2
A logical consequence from such situation is the Hobbesian bellum omnium contra
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omnes, “war all against all.” This outcome fortunately does not occur because state does
not consider every other state as threat; states pick out specific states as the ones who
could threaten them the most.3 Indeed “decision-makers act in terms of the vulnerability
they feel, which can differ from the actual situation” (Jervis, 1978).
When states assess threats, however, they tend to misperceive and miscalculate. 4
Whilst there is no shortage of works on the misperception as a cause of war,5 the causal
mechanism that explains how misperception can lead to the outbreak of war is still
underdeveloped. Nevertheless, Robert Jervis’s “spiral model” can guide us to understand
on how threat assessment involving misperception can lead the conflict between states.
In his seminal work of Perception and Misperception in International Politics,
Robert Jervis (1976, pp. 58-113) provides two models which can explain the outbreak of
war by attributing it to the role of misperceptions: deterrence and the spiral model. 6 In
“deterrence model,” war can break out when an aggressive state believes that the status
quo, defending powers are weak in capability and resolve. Such believe will further
increase when the defending state, believing that appeasement would lead to the
prevention of conflict, concede to the demand of the aggressor. The aggressor would then
push even further wishing for further concessions until it is too late for the defending state
to change course and war breaks out.
In contrast to the “deterrence model,” in “spiral model” the outbreak of war is
attributed to the very opposite kind of misperception. Instead of believing that appeasing
aggressor would lead to a more preferable behaviour, in “spiral model” the defending
state tends to overestimates the hostility of the aggressor, and vice versa. Being aware of
the consequences of living in anarchic international system where there is no higher
authority above states to enforce rules and protect the bullied, states tend equate arms
with hostile intentions. 7 Hence, when state witness other states arming, it would regard
those capabilities aims to undermine its security; a hostile image is attached on the arming
states. As soon as the hostile image has been attached, any further move by the arming
states would be regarded as a proof for their hostile intentions. Weapons, purchased for
defensive purposes, could be regarded as means to attack. This overestimation of the
hostility of other states is the first logic that states apply in “spiral model.”
In most cases, however, states fail to understand that their own behaviour can be
easily interpreted as hostile behaviour by others as well. This second logic tells that state’s
own move to strengthen its capabilities is always peaceful and that the other states are
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aware of this peaceful motive. When two states, in a dyadic relations, applying these two
logics, the result is a mutual hostility that could lead to conflict.
In the next section, I try to apply the “spiral model” on the case of ongoing U.S.China relations. In doing so, by using primary data from U.S. and China’s official
publications and their officials’ statements, I try to show how both states, to a certain
degree, apply the logic mentioned before. The application of the logics, or in other words
the misperception both states have towards each other, has been driving them towards a
conflict spiral.
DISCUSSION
Misperception in U.S.-China Relations
The rise of China as an emerging power, which started in 1980s when Deng
Xiaoping initiated economic reform in the country, has brought the country an
unprecedented economic growth. According to World Bank database, during the time of
1989-2013, China experienced 3.8 to 14.2% of annual growth of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP). As China’s economic grows, so does its national interests. China, in particular,
needs to keep its growth steady. In order to do so, China needs to secure access to
resources, energy in particular. Therefore, it appears to be a natural phenomenon when
China increases its defence expenditure in line with its economic growth (Tellis, 2005).8
Data compiled from The Military Balance reveals that China’s defence expenditures, in
absolute terms, has grown from $5.86 billion in 1989 to $391 billion in 2009. From
China’s perspectives, its increase of defence budget and military modernization are, at
least in the initial phages, not intended for any hostile purpose. China believes that its
behaviour is justifiable and that other countries in the region and U.S. are, or should be,
aware of it. In 2005 white paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development, it is stated
China’s belief that its development is inevitably peaceful due to China’s experience of
being humiliated during crisis, its historical and cultural tradition and also recent trend of
globalization that allows countries to develop in a peaceful way. 9
China, however, fails to understand that the other side of the Pacific, the statusquo power of the U.S., could possibly get the wrong impression from what China’s doing
with its military. In other words, while China believes that its behaviour is benign, it also
believes that other states, U.S. in particular, is aware of the peaceful intention. In fact,
that is not entirely true.
China’s expansion of national interests which followed by its military
modernization alarms the other side of the Pacific. An observation on U.S. official
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documents reveals how U.S. is alarmed with rapid military modernization of China. 10 As
early as 2006, U.S. has been aware that China, among other countries, has the greatest
potential to compete militarily with the U.S. In terms of military technology, U.S. is also
aware that the gap with China is closing and unless U.S. could formulate counter
strategies, its military advantages would soon be offset (U.S. Department of Defense,
2006, p. 29). The tone of anxiety about China’s military modernization has not much
changed years afterwards. In latest edition of Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2014,
p. 6), it is stated that “In the coming years, countries such as China will continue seeking
to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by
employing other new cyber and space control technologies. Similar notion is found in
2012 Department of Defense’s document of strategic guidance in which stated that
“States such as China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter our
power projection capabilities” (Panneta & Obama, 2012).
From these publications we can also get a sense on how it is very difficult, if not
entirely impossible, for states to acquire complete information regarding their
adversaries’ current and future intentions. This problem is worse in the case of China
whose authoritarian government is not really familiar with the idea of transparency. Thus,
U.S. seems to have no other choice than just equate China’s increasing military
capabilities with unfriendly intentions. In Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006, it is
stated that “… the United States, its allies and partners must also hedge against the
possibility that a major or emerging power could choose a hostile path in the future (U.S.
Department of Defense, 2006, p. 28).” It does not require a rocket science to identify the
region where there is an emerging power as well as a number of U.S. allies. In
Quadrennial Defense Review 2014, it is stated that “… the rapid pace and comprehensive
scope of China’s military modernization continues, combined with a relative lack of
transparency and openness from China’s leaders regarding both military capabilities and
intentions (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014).”
The general observations on some publications of U.S. government reveals how
U.S. feels, at the very least, alarmed by the rapid military modernization of China. Once
this hostile image attached, China’s further military modernization is regarded as a proof
to that hostile image.
This can be shown, for example, on how U.S. dubs China as developing what it
calls as Anti-Access/Area Denial capabilities which can be used, and believed is going to
be used, to deter and counter U.S. involvement in the events of conflict in China’s
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periphery. Applying our theoretical framework of “spiral model,” this stage can be
regarded as one when U.S. applying the first logic of overestimating the hostility of its
rival, in this case, China.
Feeling threatened by the perceived-as-hostile strategic behaviour of China, U.S.
starts to respond. In the midst of economic struggle and defence budget cut, U.S. tries to
check the rise of China mainly through what it calls as “rebalancing” strategy which
involves an intensification of alliances and basing strategies. The strategy covers U.S.
basing in Darwin and Guam, the provision of advanced naval weapon systems such
Patriot missiles and Aegis system to its alliances, and also diplomatic and economic
initiatives such as Trans-Pacific Partnership which exclude China. Hillary Clinton’s
“America’s Pacific Century,” (2011) one of the earliest record that lie down U.S. strategic
pivot to Asia-Pacific, provides the stated rationale behind the strategy which is to uphold
U.S. leadership commitment in the key driver area of current global politics. Interesting
to note here how Clinton frames that U.S. rebalancing is not desired by U.S. only, but
also by the region itself, hence justifying U.S. continuing presence. Another important
note is how U.S. seems to truly believe that it has been a Pacific state. This statement can
be regarded as a way U.S. tries to frame that its presence expansion in Asia-Pacific is for
benign purposes.
U.S. “rebalancing” strategy, which was initially intended to preserve stability in
the region, turns out generate the very opposite outcome. China considers U.S., with its
“rebalancing” strategy as a revisionist power that seeks to curtail China’s political
influence and harms China’s interests; as China rises, the U.S. will resist (Nathan &
Scobell, 2012). This view appears to be much influenced by China’s understanding of
U.S., as well as China’s view of the international system and how to behave in such
system.11The sense of China being threatened by U.S. strategic behaviour can also be
found in China’s official documents. In 2008 edition of China’s National Defense (2009),
U.S. military deployment realignment and its strengthened military alliances with
countries like Japan are regarded as influencing the complexity of the regional security
environment. That U.S. continues to sell advanced weapons systems to Taiwan is also
regarded as an infringement to the “one China” policy and U.S.-China joint communiqes.
These two issues have been persistently raised afterwards (China's National Defense in
2010, 2011).
2014 Shangri-La Dialogue perhaps is the perfect evidence that shows how China
is feeling threatened by U.S. strategic behaviour in Asia-Pacific, and vice versa.
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Responding to U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel that criticized China for its
“destabilizing, unilateral actions” particularly in the South China Sea, Lieutenant General
Wang Guanzhong, the Chinese military’s deputy chief of general staff said that Hagel’s
speech was designed to “create trouble and make provocations” (Han, Barnes, & Page,
2014). Lt. Gen. Wang continued by saying that Hagel’s speech was “full of hegemony,
full of words of threat and intimidation,” and part of “a provocative challenge against
China.” This speech was then backed by another Chinese official, Major General Zhu
Chenghu, who said in an interview, “If you take China as an enemy, China will absolutely
become the enemy of the U.S. (Han, Barnes, & Page, 2014).” From this exchanges of
strong words by high ranking officials from both China and U.S, we can get a sense of
antagonistic, even hostility, in the relations between the two.
The sense of being threatened by U.S.’ “rebalancing” strategy leads China to
intensify its military modernization. China continues to increase its defence expenditures,
until today. Moreover, China intensifies the development of advanced weapons systems
that provide it with capability to neutralize U.S. force in the Pacific. These capabilities,
which U.S. calls as A2/AD capabilities –which in itself is U.S.’ overestimation of China’s
hostility- ranges from fifth-generation fighter aircrafts, advanced intermediate and
medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, long-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise
missiles, counter-space weapons to offensive cyber capabilities. And as the “spiral
model” postulates, U.S. has been investing considerable amount of resources to develop
strategy to counter China’s counter-strategy against U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific. In
other words, the conflict between U.S. and China is spiralling.
CONCLUSION
Through this short paper I have shown that state’s threat assessment could become
a self-fulfilling prophecy through the initiation of conflict spiral. Using US-China
relations as a case of study, it can be understood that psychological dimension, in terms
of misperception of others’ hostility and how others perceive one’s own behaviour, play
a significant role in causing a mutual hostility between states. In the case of U.S.-China
relations, both sides to some extent see each other as a threat while believing that their
own strategic behaviour as a legitimate response to the threat they are facing. This leads
to the hostile tit-for-tat relations between U.S. and China.
As the faith of international system is very much determined by the strategic
behaviour of great powers, the development of U.S.-China relations is perhaps the most
significant feature of international relations today (Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
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Power Politics, 2001). Whilst some argue that hegemonic clash between the two is
inevitable, 12 this paper has provided a hint that U.S. and China could escape the prophecy.
As the spiral of conflict is very much attributed to misperception in states’ threat
assessment, we can argue that more intense and clear communication can perhaps break
the spiral of conflict. Both states, U.S. and China, should commit to put an effort on
transmitting messages regarding their intentions as clear as possible towards each other.
Or perhaps, it is time for Beijing and Washington to build a more direct channel of
communication as one built by Kennedy and Khrushchev during the height of the Cold
War.
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